Armstrong on thespatio-temporality of universals 1.
Provocatively, David Armstrong's properties are supposed to be both universals and spatio-temporal. What does this amount to? I consider four of Armstrong's views, in order of ascending plausibility: (1) the exemplification account, on which universals are exemplified by space-times; (2) the locatio...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 84; no. 2; pp. 301 - 309 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=21007398&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 21007398 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2006 vid: 84 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 21007398 10.1080/00048400600759209 ppf: 301 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 92KB tig: atl: Armstrong on thespatio-temporality of universals 1. aug: au: Magalhães, Ernâni affil: West Virginia University su: Universals (Philosophy) Armstrong, David Spacetime Plausibility (Logic) Philosophy sug: subj: Universals (Philosophy) Armstrong, David Spacetime Plausibility (Logic) Philosophy ab: Provocatively, David Armstrong's properties are supposed to be both universals and spatio-temporal. What does this amount to? I consider four of Armstrong's views, in order of ascending plausibility: (1) the exemplification account, on which universals are exemplified by space-times; (2) the location account, on which universals are located at space-times; (3) the first constituent account, on which spatio-temporal relations are elements of what I call the form of time; and, the true view, (4) the second constituent account, on which universals are spatio-temporal only ‘derivatively’ by being constituents of states of affairs which are so ‘primarily’. The first two accounts are rejected because they entail that space-times must be substantival. In making plausible the second constituent account, I distinguish primitive and derivative spatio-temporality. Something is primitively spatio-temporal when it is at a space-time, or stands in spatio-temporal relations. Something is derivatively spatio-temporal when it is a constituent of something primitively spatio-temporal. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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