Waiting for Enron: The Unstable Equilibrium of Auditor Independence Regulation.
A primary function of auditor independence regulation is to ensure that any financial incentives auditors may have to approve misleading or inaccurate accounting are outweighed by market and regulatory deterrents to compromising an auditor's independence. This article is an inquiry into the current...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Law & Society Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 388 - 421 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=21857323&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 21857323 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0263323X 7Q3 jtl: Journal of Law & Society issn: 0263323X maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2006 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 21857323 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2006.00364.x ppf: 388 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 189KB tig: atl: Waiting for Enron: The Unstable Equilibrium of Auditor Independence Regulation. aug: au: Kershaw, David affil: Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, England su: Auditors Accounting Monetary incentives Economic equilibrium Acquiescence (International law) United Kingdom sug: subj: United Kingdom Auditors Accounting Monetary incentives Economic equilibrium Acquiescence (International law) ab: A primary function of auditor independence regulation is to ensure that any financial incentives auditors may have to approve misleading or inaccurate accounting are outweighed by market and regulatory deterrents to compromising an auditor's independence. This article is an inquiry into the current state of this incentive equilibrium in the United Kingdom: the possible costs and benefits that may be incurred by auditors if they elect to acquiesce to management's demands to accept problematic accounting. It argues that the equilibrium position currently incentivizes a rational auditor to acquiesce. On the one hand, the article demonstrates that the recent evolution of audit firm revenue streams has provided auditors with a substantial incentive to compromise their independence and provided management with credible sanctions to pressurize them to do so. On the other hand, the article shows that regulatory and market costs of acquiescence do not counterbalance the benefits of acquiescence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Law & Society is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Law & Society holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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