Coincidence as Overlap.
Material constitution and coincidence are widely discussed but poorly understood. This paper is an attempt to make progress by developing an account of how numerically distinct material objects coincide when one constitutes the other. I address two central issues: first, do material coincidents sha...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 40; no. 4; pp. 623 - 660 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=22952628&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 22952628 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2006 vid: 40 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 22952628 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00627.x ppf: 623 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 202KB tig: atl: Coincidence as Overlap. aug: au: Paul, L. A. affil: University of Arizona and the Australian National University, RSSS su: Coincidence Constitution (Philosophy) Whole & parts (Philosophy) Supervenience (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) Resemblance (Philosophy) Individuation (Psychology) sug: subj: Coincidence Constitution (Philosophy) Whole & parts (Philosophy) Supervenience (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) Resemblance (Philosophy) Individuation (Psychology) ab: Material constitution and coincidence are widely discussed but poorly understood. This paper is an attempt to make progress by developing an account of how numerically distinct material objects coincide when one constitutes the other. I address two central issues: first, do material coincidents share their proper spatiotemporal parts, and if so, do they share all of them? Second, how can material coincidents share their spatiotemporal location and matter, so share material properties such as having mass m, shape s, and location l, but not share all of their properties? To answer these questions, I develop a property mereology for objects and argue that coincidents overlap with respect to all of their spatiotemporal parts but not all of their property parts. If we can adequately explicate coincidence, we can begin to answer questions about material constitution and related questions about "de re" modality, persistence, supervenience, redundant causation, event individuation, personal identity, nonreductive materialism in mind, and reference. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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