Leibnizian Chronadology: Monads and Time.

I argue that we can learn quite a lot about Leibniz's metaphysics, in particular about monads and their relationship to time, by viewing Leibniz through a McTaggartian lens. After presenting McTaggart's highly influential two basic conceptions of time, the A- (or tensed) and B- (or tenseless) concep...

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Published in:Journal of Philosophical Research Vol. 31; pp. 185 - 219
Main Author: Pessin, Andrew
Format: Article
Published: Philosophy Documentation Center 2006
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Leibnizian Chronadology: Monads and Time.
      aug:
        au: Pessin, Andrew
        affil: Connecticut College
      su:
        Monadology
        Metaphysics
        Ontology
        Spacetime
        Sensory perception
        Analogy
      sug:
        subj:
          Monadology
          Metaphysics
          Ontology
          Spacetime
          Sensory perception
          Analogy
      ab: I argue that we can learn quite a lot about Leibniz's metaphysics, in particular about monads and their relationship to time, by viewing Leibniz through a McTaggartian lens. After presenting McTaggart's highly influential two basic conceptions of time, the A- (or tensed) and B- (or tenseless) conceptions, I distinguish four possible models of the relationship between monads and time: the first two invoke tenses, differing in whether they treat non-present states as "real," while the latter two are tenseless, differing in whether we construe the monad as (tenselessly) manifesting distinguishable perceptual states or as being in one indivisible but complex perceptual state representing the "world" as varying over time. A detailed study of the relative merits and demerits of the four models supports, I argue, the last model. Along the way I provide a Leibnizian account of the conscious illusion of temporal flow.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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