Persons are not made of temporal parts.

The article discusses four-dimensionalism, a philosophical view that ordinary things last by having temporal parts, and contends that people are not made of temporal parts. A philosophical discussion of three-dimensionality and four-dimensionality is presented. The author discusses space-time worms...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Analysis Vol. 67; no. 1; pp. 7 - 12
Autor principal: Stone, Jim
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Stone, Jim
        affil: *The University of New Orleans LA, USA
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        Fourth dimension
        Spacetime
        Philosophy
        Wormholes (Physics)
        Time
        Chisholm, Roderick M., 1916-1999
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          Fourth dimension
          Spacetime
          Philosophy
          Wormholes (Physics)
          Time
          Chisholm, Roderick M., 1916-1999
      ab: The article discusses four-dimensionalism, a philosophical view that ordinary things last by having temporal parts, and contends that people are not made of temporal parts. A philosophical discussion of three-dimensionality and four-dimensionality is presented. The author discusses space-time worms to illustrate his discussion of temporal parts. The author furthers an argument by Roderick Chisholm about how a "stand-in" cannot have his thoughts for him.
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    language: English
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