Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct.
In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (2005) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction "violates sound probabilistic thinking" (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain as...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 72; no. 5; pp. 1135 - 1146 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=24277114&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 24277114 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2005 vid: 72 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 24277114 10.1086/508122 ppf: 1135 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 103KB tig: atl: Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct. aug: au: Pfeifer, Jessica affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250 su: Statistical correlation Probability theory Natural selection Biological evolution Heredity Physical fitness sug: subj: Statistical correlation Probability theory Natural selection Biological evolution Heredity Physical fitness ab: In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (2005) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction "violates sound probabilistic thinking" (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction. Whether selection and drift can be thought of as causally distinct, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection. In particular, if the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment, then selection and drift might in fact be causally distinct. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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