Heritability and Genetic Causation.
The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not trace genetic causation. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 72; no. 5; pp. 699 - 710 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
Dec2005
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=24277119&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 24277119 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2005 vid: 72 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 24277119 10.1086/508126 ppf: 699 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 84KB tig: atl: Heritability and Genetic Causation. aug: au: Oftedal, Gry affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Box 1020 Blindern, N-0315 Oslo, Norway su: Human genetics Human biology Physical anthropology Causation (Philosophy) Heredity Genetic research Lewontin, Richard, 1929-2021 Sesardic, Neven sug: subj: Human genetics Human biology Physical anthropology Causation (Philosophy) Heredity Genetic research Lewontin, Richard, 1929-2021 Sesardic, Neven ab: The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not trace genetic causation. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism. I present and discuss two opposing views on these matters represented by Richard Lewontin and Neven Sesardic. I suggest that the conflicting perspectives are based in differing concepts of genetic causation and differing motivations and contexts of discussion. I use the distinction between structuring and triggering causes to clarify the basis for the opposing views. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|