The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism.
Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991; Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 73; no. 3; pp. 277 - 298 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=25122640&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 25122640 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2006 vid: 73 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 25122640 10.1086/515416 ppf: 277 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 275KB tig: atl: The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism. aug: au: Brandon, Robert N. Nijhout, H. Frederik affil: Department of Philosophy, Duke University, 201 West Building, Box 90743, Durham, NC 27708 Department of Biology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708 su: Genes Evolutionary psychology Heredity Selfish genetic elements Natural selection Dawkins, Richard, 1941- Waters, C. K. sug: subj: Genes Evolutionary psychology Heredity Selfish genetic elements Natural selection Dawkins, Richard, 1941- Waters, C. K. ab: Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991; Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker view that in many cases there are multiple equally adequate accounts of evolutionary events, but that always among the set of equally adequate representations will be one at the genic level. We describe a range of cases all involving stable equilibria actively maintained by selection. In these cases genotypic models correctly show that selection is active at the equilibrium point. In contrast, the genic models have selection disappearing at equilibrium. For deterministic models this difference makes no difference. However, once drift is added in, the two sets of models diverge in their predicted evolutionary trajectories. Thus, contrary to received wisdom on this matter, the two sets of models are not empirically equivalent. Moreover, the genic models get the facts wrong. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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