Innateness as Closed Process Invariance.

Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cas...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 73; no. 3; pp. 323 - 345
Autores principales: Mallon, Ron, Weinberg, Jonathan M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jul2006
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Mallon, Ron
          Weinberg, Jonathan M.
        affil:
          Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 260 S. Central Campus Dr., Room 341, Salt Lake City, UT 84112
          Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, 1033 E. Third St., Sycamore Hall 026, Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
      su:
        Innate ideas (Philosophy)
        Cognitive science
        Nativism (Psychology)
        Philosophy & cognitive science
        Stich, Stephen
        Sober, Elliott
        Ariew, Andre
        Samuels, Richard
      sug:
        subj:
          Innate ideas (Philosophy)
          Cognitive science
          Nativism (Psychology)
          Philosophy & cognitive science
          Stich, Stephen
          Sober, Elliott
          Ariew, Andre
          Samuels, Richard
      ab: Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count as innate. Appeals to canalization (Ariew) or to psychological primitiveness (Samuels) fail to handle this liberalism problem. We suggest a novel approach to innateness: closed process invariantism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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