Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.
A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 85; no. 2; pp. 205 - 220 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=25272296&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 25272296 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2007 vid: 85 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 25272296 10.1080/00048400701342988 ppf: 205 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 126KB tig: atl: Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error. aug: au: Egan, Andy affil: Australian National University, University of Michigan su: Expressivism (Ethics) Ethics Expression (Philosophy) Realism Philosophy Logical fallacies sug: subj: Expressivism (Ethics) Ethics Expression (Philosophy) Realism Philosophy Logical fallacies ab: A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is where the initial worry finally sticks - quasi-realism tells me that I can't be fundamentally wrong about morality, though others can. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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