Re-Inventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind.
Recent advances in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new human-machine interfaces (in general) and new brain-machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the increasing prominence of such ideas, the v...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Medicine & Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 3; pp. 263 - 283 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
May/Jun2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=25729530&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 25729530 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03605310 MPS jtl: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy issn: 03605310 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May/Jun2007 vid: 32 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 25729530 10.1080/03605310701397024 ppf: 263 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 133KB tig: atl: Re-Inventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind. aug: au: Clark, Andy affil: University of Edinburgh, Scotland su: Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science Performance technology Neuroethics sug: subj: Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science Performance technology Neuroethics keyword: embodiment interface plasticity sensory substitution ab: Recent advances in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new human-machine interfaces (in general) and new brain-machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the increasing prominence of such ideas, the very idea of such an interface remains surprisingly under-explored. In particular, the notion of human enhancement suggests an image of the embodied and reasoning agent as literally extended or augmented, rather than the more conservative image of a standard (non-enhanced) agent using a tool via some new interface. In this essay, I explore this difference, and attempt to lay out some of the conditions under which the more radical reading (positing brand new integrated agents or systemic wholes) becomes justified. I adduce some empirical evidence suggesting that the radical result is well within our scientific reach. The main reason why this is so has less to do with the advancement of our science (though that certainly helps) than with our native biological plasticity. We humans, I shall try to show, are biologically disposed towards literal (and repeated) episodes of sensory re-calibration, of bodily re-configuration and of mental extension. Such potential for literal and repeated re-configuration is the mark of what I shall call "profoundly embodied agency," contrasting it with a variety of weaker (less philosophically and scientifically interesting) understandings of the nature and importance of embodiment for minds and persons. The article ends by relating the image of profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning converging technologies for improving human performance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.. item: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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