BRING BACK THE MAGIC.

Magical ersatzism is the view that possible worlds are primitive abstract entities. In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis presented what appeared to many to be a devastating argument against magical ersatzism. In this paper, I show that Lewis’ central argument does not succeed. Magical ersatzis...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 391 - 403
Autor principal: ZARAGOZA, KEVIN
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2007
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Modality (Theory of knowledge)
        Magic
        Abstracts
        Plurality of worlds
        Lewis, David
        Debate
        Philosophy
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          Modality (Theory of knowledge)
          Magic
          Abstracts
          Plurality of worlds
          Lewis, David
          Debate
          Philosophy
      ab: Magical ersatzism is the view that possible worlds are primitive abstract entities. In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis presented what appeared to many to be a devastating argument against magical ersatzism. In this paper, I show that Lewis’ central argument does not succeed. Magical ersatzism remains a viable theory of possible worlds.
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