Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution.
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts....
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 136; no. 1; pp. 59 - 98 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=26515535&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 26515535 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2007 vid: 136 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 26515535 10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7 ppf: 59 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 289KB tig: atl: Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. aug: au: Guerrero, Alexander affil: New York University , 5 Washington Place, 2nd Floor New York 10003 USA su: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsibility Abortion Contextualism (Philosophy) Philosophy sug: subj: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsibility Abortion Contextualism (Philosophy) Philosophy keyword: Blameless ignorance Blameworthiness Caution Contextualism Culpability Moral ignorance Recklessness Vegetarianism ab: This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2007. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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