Visual Awareness of Properties.
I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of p...
| Published in: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 75; no. 2; pp. 298 - 326 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2007
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=27013663&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 27013663 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2007 vid: 75 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 27013663 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00077.x ppf: 298 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 162KB tig: atl: Visual Awareness of Properties. aug: au: KENNEDY, MATTHEW J. affil: University of Nottingham su: Theory of knowledge Object constancy (Psychoanalysis) Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Compromise (Ethics) Resemblance (Philosophy) Belief & doubt Awareness sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Object constancy (Psychoanalysis) Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Compromise (Ethics) Resemblance (Philosophy) Belief & doubt Awareness ab: I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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