Visual Cognition: Where Cognition and Culture Meet.
Case studies of diverse scientific fields show how scientists use a range of resources to generate new interpretative models and to establish their plausibility as explanations of a domain. They accomplish this by manipulating imagistic representations in particular ways. I show that scientists in d...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 73; no. 5; pp. 688 - 699 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2006
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=27159504&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 27159504 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2006 vid: 73 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 27159504 10.1086/518523 ppf: 688 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.7MB tig: atl: Visual Cognition: Where Cognition and Culture Meet. aug: au: Gooding, David C. affil: Science Studies Centre, Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom su: Representation (Philosophy) Simulation methods & models Models & modelmaking Inference (Logic) Visualization Cognition sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Simulation methods & models Models & modelmaking Inference (Logic) Visualization Cognition ab: Case studies of diverse scientific fields show how scientists use a range of resources to generate new interpretative models and to establish their plausibility as explanations of a domain. They accomplish this by manipulating imagistic representations in particular ways. I show that scientists in different domains use the same basic transformations. Common features of these transformations indicate that general cognitive strategies of interpretation, simplification, elaboration, and argumentation are at work. Social and historical studies of science emphasize the diversity of local contexts of practice. However, the existence of common strategies shows that this diversity masks an important repertoire of cognitive strategies. Scientists use this repertoire to adapt their representations to meet the cognitive demands of different contexts of practice. This paper considers the implications of this finding for the notion of scientists as cognitive agents in distributed knowledge-producing systems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2006 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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