A Statistical Explanation for Extreme Bids in the House Market.

This paper proposes a simple statistical explanation for the phenomenon of extreme bids. During a boom, the housing market regime switches from a single bidder to a multiple bidder environment. The sale price in a multiple bidder auction is the maximum bid and the distribution of maximum bids contai...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Urban Studies (Routledge) Vol. 44; no. 12; pp. 2339 - 2356
Autores principales: Levin, Eric J., Pryce, Gwilym B. J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Nov2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=27256749&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 27256749
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00420980
        UST
      jtl: Urban Studies (Routledge)
      issn: 00420980
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Nov2007
      vid: 44
      iid: 12
      pid: 377
      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
    artinfo:
      ui:
        27256749
        10.1080/00420980701540903
      ppf: 2339
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 429KB
      tig:
        atl: A Statistical Explanation for Extreme Bids in the House Market.
      aug:
        au:
          Levin, Eric J.
          Pryce, Gwilym B. J.
      su:
        Housing market
        Buyer's market
        Housing finance
        Auctions
        Bidders
      sug:
        subj:
          Housing market
          Buyer's market
          Housing finance
          Auctions
          Bidders
      ab: This paper proposes a simple statistical explanation for the phenomenon of extreme bids. During a boom, the housing market regime switches from a single bidder to a multiple bidder environment. The sale price in a multiple bidder auction is the maximum bid and the distribution of maximum bids contains a much higher proportion of extreme bids compared with the distribution of single bidder valuations. While this theory does not preclude behavioural explanations of extreme bids, it does demonstrate that a world free from strategic and idiosyncratic behaviour would not be a world free from extreme bids during boom periods. Therefore, when gauging the impact of strategic or idiosyncratic behaviour (either hypothetically or empirically) one has to measure the effect against a baseline regime where extreme bids are inevitable, not against a world that is free from extreme bids.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Urban Studies (Routledge) is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Urban Studies (Routledge)
      holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2007
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N