CAUSAL DETERMINANTS, REASONS, AND SUBSTANTIVE AUTONOMY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO AGENCY.

Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, it faces a problem vis-à-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper, I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Th...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 72; pp. 135 - 145
Autor principal: Baç, Murat
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: CAUSAL DETERMINANTS, REASONS, AND SUBSTANTIVE AUTONOMY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO AGENCY.
      aug:
        au: Baç, Murat
        affil: Bogaziçi University, Department of Philosophy, Bebek, Istanbul, 34342 Turkey
      su:
        Causation (Philosophy)
        Free will & determinism
        Autonomy (Psychology)
        Agency theory
        Choice (Psychology)
        Will
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        subj:
          Causation (Philosophy)
          Free will & determinism
          Autonomy (Psychology)
          Agency theory
          Choice (Psychology)
          Will
      keyword:
        agency
        event causation
        free will
        reasons
        substantive autonomy
        įvykių priežastinis sąlygojimas
        autonomiškas veikėjas (agency)
        laisva valia
        paskatos
        substantyvi autonomija
      ab:
        Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, it faces a problem vis-à-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper, I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Then I argue that the agency theories nonetheless fail in general to give a satisfactory account of various sorts of reasons underlying our actions and choices. In trying to enlighten the multi-faceted nature of actions and agency, I define a novel concept, "substantive autonomy," and claim that it is a basic fact valid for all animals, not only humans, that are capable of initiating action. Reasons may indeed be lying behind our actions in a non-deterministic and ubiquitous manner, but agency often works in the absence of sophisticated (discursive) reasons which are evidently characteristic of humans.
        Nors agento kaip autonomiško veikėjo (agency) sąvoka atrodo patrauklus laisvos valios galvosūkio sprendimas, ji susiduria vis-à-vis su klausimu apie tai, koks yra tariamų veiksmo paskatų pobūdis. Siame straipsnyje aš pirmiausia aptariu paradigminio posūkio, susijusio su agentu kaip autonomišku veikėju, reikšmę. Tačiau mano požiūriu, agento autonomijos teorijos vis dėlto nepajėgia patenkinamai paaiškinti daugelio mūsų veiksmų ir pasirinkimų paskatų. Siekdamas paaiškinti daugeriopą veiksmų ir veikėjų prigimtį, aš pavartoju naują „substantyvios autonomijos" sąvoką ir tvirtinu, jog tai pamatinis ne tik žmogaus, bet ir visų gyvūnų, gebančių imtis veiksmo, prigimties ypatumas. Priežastys, lemiančios mūsų veiksmus, iš tiesų gali būti su jais susijusios nedeterministiškai ir visaapimančiai, tačiau autonomiškas veikėjas neretai veikia neturėdamas tam jokių sudėtingų (diskursyvių) paskatų, kuriomis neabejotinai remiasi žmonės.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
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