Moderate structural realism about space-time.

Abstract  This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure)...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 160; no. 1; pp. 27 - 47
Autores principales: Michael Esfeld, Vincent Lam
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jan2008
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Michael Esfeld
          Vincent Lam
        affil: University of Lausanne Department of Philosophy & Centre romand for Logic, History and Philosophy of Science CH-1015 Lausanne Switzerland
      su:
        Realism
        Spacetime
        Ontology
        General relativity (Physics)
      sug:
        subj:
          Realism
          Spacetime
          Ontology
          General relativity (Physics)
      ab: Abstract  This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulation.
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    language: English
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