Contrast, inference and scientific realism.
Abstract  The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 160; no. 2; pp. 249 - 268 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=28332218&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 28332218 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2008 vid: 160 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 28332218 10.1007/s11229-006-9117-x ppf: 249 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 235KB tig: atl: Contrast, inference and scientific realism. aug: au: Mark Day George Botterill affil: Univerisity of Sheffield Department of Philosopy Arts Tower, Western Bank Sheffield SIO 2TN UK su: Realism Inference (Logic) Judgment (Logic) Manipulative behavior sug: subj: Realism Inference (Logic) Judgment (Logic) Manipulative behavior ab: Abstract  The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causalâexplanatory inference will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to âreason from the phenomenaâ. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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