Colour constancy as counterfactual.
In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcoming...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 86; no. 1; pp. 61 - 93 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=29411118&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 29411118 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2008 vid: 86 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 29411118 10.1080/00048400701846566 ppf: 61 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 514KB tig: atl: Colour constancy as counterfactual. aug: au: Cohen, Jonathan affil: University of California, San Diego su: Psychology of color Counterfactuals (Logic) Color vision Philosophy Sensory perception sug: subj: Psychology of color Counterfactuals (Logic) Color vision Philosophy Sensory perception ab: In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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