Time for Change.

Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori...

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Publicado en:Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 497 - 514
Autores principales: Hales, Steven D., Johnson, Timothy A.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Winter2007
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Hales, Steven D.
          Johnson, Timothy A.
        affil: Professor of Philosophy, Bloomsburg University
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        Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of mind
        Metaphysics
        Spacetime
        Theory of knowledge
        Intuition
        Rationalism
      sug:
        subj:
          Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of mind
          Metaphysics
          Spacetime
          Theory of knowledge
          Intuition
          Rationalism
      ab: Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken-an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly those in (special) relativistic circumstances, it becomes clear that only a perdurance account of change is adequate.
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