What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem.
When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues fo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 76; no. 2; pp. 237 - 310 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2008
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=30072183&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 30072183 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2008 vid: 76 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 30072183 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00133.x ppf: 237 ppct: 73 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 370KB tig: atl: What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem. aug: au: POLLOCK, JOHN L. affil: University of Arizona su: Philosophy of mind Computers Philosophers Computer files Word processing software Email systems Cybernetics Scholars Philosophy sug: subj: Philosophy of mind Computers Philosophers Computer files Word processing software Email systems Cybernetics Scholars Philosophy ab: When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|