WHITHER INTERNALISM? HOW INTERNALISTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THE EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS.
A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not ref...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 163 - 185 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=31129461&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 31129461 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2008 vid: 39 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 31129461 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00535.x ppf: 163 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 160KB tig: atl: WHITHER INTERNALISM? HOW INTERNALISTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THE EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS. aug: au: BARTLETT, GARY affil: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Central Washington University, 400 E. University Way, Mail Stop 7555, Ellensburg, WA 98926‐7555, USA su: Philosophy Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophy of mind Individualism Internalism (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Philosophy Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophy of mind Individualism Internalism (Theory of knowledge) keyword: active externalism causal basis of the mind extended mind individualism internalism mental content supervenience vehicle externalism ab: A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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