SUBJECT SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM: IN MEMORIAM.
Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58; no. 231; pp. 318 - 326 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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