NESATYS KAIP REDUKTYVISTINĖS PRIEŽASTINGUMO ANALIZĖS ARGUMENTAS.
The article advances an argument in favour of the reductionist, Humean conception of causation. The author draws upon an insight of David Lewis and Hugh Mellor: there can be no irreducible relation between causes and their effects, because not only the case that something exists, but also the case t...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 73; pp. 104 - 115 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=31575638&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 31575638 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2008 vid: 73 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 31575638 10.15388/Problemos.2008.0.2014 ppf: 104 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 223KB tig: atl: NESATYS KAIP REDUKTYVISTINĖS PRIEŽASTINGUMO ANALIZĖS ARGUMENTAS. aug: au: Grenda, Vytautas affil: Vilniaus universiteto, Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius su: Reductionism Causation (Philosophy) Lewis, David Mellor, Hugh Causal models Supervenience (Philosophy) sug: subj: Reductionism Causation (Philosophy) Lewis, David Mellor, Hugh Causal models Supervenience (Philosophy) keyword: absences causation humeanism hiumizmas nesatys priežastingumas ab: The article advances an argument in favour of the reductionist, Humean conception of causation. The author draws upon an insight of David Lewis and Hugh Mellor: there can be no irreducible relation between causes and their effects, because not only the case that something exists, but also the case that something does not exist (i. e. absence) can be called a cause or an effect. If there's no such a relation, then the thought experiments that are directed against the so-called "Humean supervenience" thesis cannot prove that causation is an irreducible feature of the world. The utmost such experiments can prove is that the ordinary conception of causation is inconsistent. Straipsnis supažindina su argumentu už reduktyvistinę, hiumišką priežastingumo sampratą. Remiamasi Davido Lewiso ir Hugh'o Melloro įžvalga, kad negali egzistuoti priežastis ir jų padarinius siejantis santykis, nes priežastimis ar padariniais gali būti vadinami ne tik pozityvūs, bet ir negatyvūs faktai ar įvykiai (nesatys). Jeigu toks santykis neegzistuoja, tai prieš vadinamąją „hiumiškojo supervenavimo" tezę nukreipti mintiniai eksperimentai negali įrodyti, jog priežastingumas yra neredukuojama pasaulio ypatybė. Daugiausia, ką jie gali įrodyti, -- tai įprastinės priežastingumo sampratos prieštaringumą. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Lithuanian refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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