J. MCTAGGART AND H. MELLOR ON TIME.
The article analyzes John McTaggart's argument for unreality of time, a classical piece of fin de sičcle Brittish idealist metaphysics. Having accepted the distinction between A-series and B-series, one can only resist McTaggartian conclusion by denying at least one of the two: that B-series alone i...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 73; pp. 115 - 122 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Vilnius University
2008
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=31575639&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 31575639 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2008 vid: 73 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 31575639 10.15388/Problemos.2008.0.2013 ppf: 115 ppct: 7 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 179KB tig: atl: J. MCTAGGART AND H. MELLOR ON TIME. aug: au: Dagys, Jonas affil: Vilniaus universiteto, Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius su: McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1866-1925 Metaphysics Idealism Mellor, Hugh Change Reality sug: subj: McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1866-1925 Metaphysics Idealism Mellor, Hugh Change Reality keyword: British idealism change metaphysics time britų idealizmas kismas laikas metafizika ab: The article analyzes John McTaggart's argument for unreality of time, a classical piece of fin de sičcle Brittish idealist metaphysics. Having accepted the distinction between A-series and B-series, one can only resist McTaggartian conclusion by denying at least one of the two: that B-series alone is insufficient for change or that A-series implies a contradiction. Hugh Mellor's criticism is taken to represent this strategy. The lesson to be learnt from this debate is that if the world is conceived as a mere totality of facts no change could be real in such a world, and so McTaggart would right. However, if the reality of things determining those facts is recognized as more fundamental, it would not be denied that at least some of these things undergo genuine temporal change, and time as a dimension of this real change cannot be rejected. Straipsnyje analizuojamas vienas garsiausių XIX--XX a. sandūros britų idealistinės metafizikos pavyzdžių -- Johno McTaggarto argumentas, neigiantis savarankišką laiko egzistavimą. Teigiama, kad, priimdami McTaggarto įvestą A sekos ir B sekos skirtį, susilaikyti nuo jo siūlomos išvados galime tik neigdami B sekos nepakankamumą kismui paaiškinti arba A sekos implicitišką prieštaringumą. Kaip būdingiausias tokios strategijos atvejis čia tiriama Hugh'o Melloro kritika. McTaggarto ir Melloro polemikoje paaiškėja, kad jei pasaulį laikytume faktų (o ne daiktų) visuma, tai tokiame pasaulyje tikras kismas nebūtų įmanomas ir McTaggartas būtų teisus. Tačiau jei tuos faktus nulemiančių daiktų tikrovę laikysime fundamentalesne, turėsime pripažinti, kad bent kai kurie šių daiktų kinta, ir laiko kaip pagrindinio šio kismo matmens negalima atsisakyti. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|