Motivating Reductionism about Sets.

The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 86; no. 2; pp. 295 - 308
Autor principal: Paseau, Alexander
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jun2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32707966&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 32707966
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00048402
        BHK
      jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 00048402
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2008
      vid: 86
      iid: 2
      pid: 377
      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
    artinfo:
      ui:
        32707966
        10.1080/00048400801886454
      ppf: 295
      ppct: 13
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 127KB
      tig:
        atl: Motivating Reductionism about Sets.
      aug:
        au: Paseau, Alexander
        affil: University of Oxford
      su:
        Set theory
        Reductionism
        Philosophy
        Ontology
        Motivation (Psychology)
      sug:
        subj:
          Set theory
          Reductionism
          Philosophy
          Ontology
          Motivation (Psychology)
      ab: The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2008
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N