Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem.
The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, in part, a consequence of the assumpt...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 16; no. 3; pp. 323 - 350 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32794063&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32794063 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2008 vid: 16 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 32794063 10.1080/09672550802113235 ppf: 323 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 106KB tig: atl: Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem. aug: au: Wheeler, Michael affil: University of Stirling, Scotland su: Frames (Social sciences) Phenomenology Cognitive science Artificial intelligence Representation (Philosophy) Intelligence levels Context effects (Psychology) Psychology & philosophy sug: subj: Frames (Social sciences) Phenomenology Cognitive science Artificial intelligence Representation (Philosophy) Intelligence levels Context effects (Psychology) Psychology & philosophy keyword: background coping continuous reciprocal causation frame problem Heidegger representations situatedness ab: The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, in part, a consequence of the assumption (made by mainstream cognitive science and artificial intelligence) that intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. Dreyfus' Heideggerian analysis suggests that the frame problem dissolves if we reject representationalism about intelligence and recognize that human agents realize the property of thrownness (the property of being always already embedded in a context). I argue that this positive proposal is incomplete until we understand exactly how the properties in question may be instantiated in machines like us. So, working within a broadly Heideggerian conceptual framework, I pursue the character of a representation-shunning thrown machine. As part of this analysis, I suggest that the frame problem is, in truth, a two-headed beast. The intra-context frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action within a context. The inter-context frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action in worlds in which adaptation to new contexts is open-ended and in which the number of potential contexts is indeterminate. Drawing on the field of situated robotics, I suggest that the intra-context frame problem may be neutralized by systems of special-purpose adaptive couplings, while the inter-context frame problem may be neutralized by systems that exhibit the phenomenon of continuous reciprocal causation. I also defend the view that while continuous reciprocal causation is in conflict with representational explanation, special-purpose adaptive coupling, as well as its associated agential phenomenology, may feature representations. My proposal has been criticized recently by Dreyfus, who accuses me of propagating a cognitivist misreading of Heidegger, one that, because it maintains a role for representation, leads me seriously astray in my handling of the frame problem. I close by responding to Dreyfus' concerns. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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