Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity.
Abstract In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 162; no. 3; pp. 385 - 405 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32813407&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32813407 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2008 vid: 162 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 32813407 10.1007/s11229-007-9250-1 ppf: 385 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 179KB tig: atl: Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity. aug: au: Troy Catterson affil: North Georgia College and State University 82 College Circle Dahlonega GA 30597 USA su: Subjectivity Identity (Psychology) Belief & doubt Experience sug: subj: Subjectivity Identity (Psychology) Belief & doubt Experience ab: Abstract In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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