Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics.
Abstract Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolu...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 162; no. 3; pp. 439 - 451 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jun2008
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32813411&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32813411 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2008 vid: 162 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 32813411 10.1007/s11229-007-9246-x ppf: 439 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 131KB tig: atl: Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics. aug: su: Neurology Psychiatry Mind & body Phenomenalism sug: subj: Neurology Psychiatry Mind & body Phenomenalism ab: Abstract Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolutionary therapeutic implications for neurology and psychiatry. All these selves, according to Kolak—even the purely imaginary ones that exist as such only in our dreams—are not just conscious but also self-conscious, with beliefs, intentions, living lives informed by memories (confabulatory, in the case of the fictional ones) and personal histories. Kolak’s derivation of psychiatrically relevant aspects of his theory—a neurological rendition of a Kantian transcendental argument—can be given a straightforward neurological, and therefore open to scientific scrutiny, interpretation that would then more easily lend itself to the clinical setting in which these perplexing phenomena, along with their purveyors, must live and cope. This will be the main focus of this paper. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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