Counting subjects.
Abstract Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a f...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 162; no. 3; pp. 373 - 385 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32813412&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32813412 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2008 vid: 162 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 32813412 10.1007/s11229-007-9249-7 ppf: 373 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 134KB tig: atl: Counting subjects. aug: au: Garrett Thomson affil: Scovel Hall, 944 College Mall Wooster OH 44691 USA su: Academic dissertations Apperception Empirical research Idealism sug: subj: Academic dissertations Apperception Empirical research Idealism ab: Abstract Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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