Can There Be Stochastic Evolutionary Causes?
Do evolutionary processes such as selection and random drift cause evolutionary change, or are they merely convenient ways of describing or summarizing it? Philosophers have lined up on both sides of this question. One recent defense (Reisman and Forber 2005) of the causal status of selection and dr...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 74; no. 5; pp. 616 - 628 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32869846&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32869846 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2007 vid: 74 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 32869846 10.1086/525608 ppf: 616 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 130KB tig: atl: Can There Be Stochastic Evolutionary Causes? aug: au: Forber, Patrick Reisman, Kenneth affil: Patrick Forber, Tufts University, Philosophy Department, Miner Hall, Medford, MA 02155 su: Causation (Philosophy) Natural selection Biological evolution Philosophy of biology Stochastic analysis sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Natural selection Biological evolution Philosophy of biology Stochastic analysis ab: Do evolutionary processes such as selection and random drift cause evolutionary change, or are they merely convenient ways of describing or summarizing it? Philosophers have lined up on both sides of this question. One recent defense (Reisman and Forber 2005) of the causal status of selection and drift appeals to a manipulability theory of causation. Yet, even if one accepts manipulability, there are still reasons to doubt that genetic drift, in particular, is genuinely causal. We will address two challenges to treating drift as causal within a manipulation framework. We will argue that both challenges ultimately fail, but that they raise interesting and subtle issues about the nature of causation and the differences between selection and drift. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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