Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves.
It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say "contradictions are impossible so so...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 74; no. 5; pp. 724 - 736 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2007
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32869855&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32869855 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2007 vid: 74 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 32869855 10.1086/525617 ppf: 724 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 95KB tig: atl: Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves. aug: au: Dowe, Phil su: Paradox Time travel Spacetime Physics Logic sug: subj: Paradox Time travel Spacetime Physics Logic ab: It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say "contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox" commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions explain why contradictions do not arise, and the latter have been proved to avoid constraints on initial data. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2007 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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