On Amnesia and Knowing-How.
In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson's 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as "Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle" is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the...
| Publicado en: | Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology Vol. 12; no. 1; pp. 36 - 48 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Philosophy Documentation Center
Winter2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=32926566&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 32926566 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01617249 2Y0N jtl: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology issn: 01617249 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Winter2008 vid: 12 iid: 1 pid: 2411 pub: Philosophy Documentation Center artinfo: ui: 32926566 ppf: 36 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 82KB tig: atl: On Amnesia and Knowing-How. aug: au: Bzdak, David affil: Syracuse University su: Amnesia Intellect Personality & intelligence Theory of knowledge Knowledge representation (Information theory) Explicit memory Memory Psychology sug: subj: Amnesia Intellect Personality & intelligence Theory of knowledge Knowledge representation (Information theory) Explicit memory Memory Psychology ab: In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson's 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as "Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle" is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the case of a famous amnesic patient named Henry M. who is capable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-how but who is incapable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-that. In the first two sections of the paper, I introduce the topic of knowledge-how and give a brief overview of Stanley and Williamson's position. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the case of Henry M. and explain why it is plausible to describe him as someone who can retain new knowledge-how but not new knowledge-that. In the final sections of the paper, I argue that Henry M.'s case does indeed provide a counterexample to Stanley and Williamson's analysis of knowing-how as a species of knowing-that, and I consider and respond to possible objections to my argument. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology is the property of Philosophy Documentation Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology holder: Philosophy Documentation Center dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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