The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist.
<div class="Abstract"><a name="Abs1"></a><span class="AbstractHeading">Abstract </span>We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 163; no. 3; pp. 305 - 315 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=33049950&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 33049950 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2008 vid: 163 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 33049950 10.1007/s11229-007-9303-5 ppf: 305 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 128KB tig: atl: The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist. aug: au: Deborah Mayo Jean Miller affil: Virginia Tech Department of Philosophy 235 Major Williams Hall (0126) Blacksburg VA 24061 USA Virginia Tech Department of Philosophy 211 Major Williams Hall (0126) Blacksburg VA 24061 USA su: Ends & means Scientific method Comparison (Philosophy) Philosophy & science sug: subj: Ends & means Scientific method Comparison (Philosophy) Philosophy & science ab: <div class="Abstract"><a name="Abs1"></a><span class="AbstractHeading">Abstract </span>We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data. </div> pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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