Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, abo...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 46; no. 2; pp. 221 - 245 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=33228117&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 33228117 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2008 vid: 46 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 33228117 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00077.x ppf: 221 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 162KB tig: atl: Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. aug: au: Kelp, Christoph affil: Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven su: Theory of knowledge Philosophy Intellect Thought & thinking Apperception Lotteries sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Philosophy Intellect Thought & thinking Apperception Lotteries ab: This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as the most promising classical invariantist solution to the puzzle, namely, that beliefs about the outcomes of fair lotteries do not qualify as knowledge because they are too lucky to do so (or, relatedly, because they do not satisfy a safety condition on knowledge), while other beliefs based on potentially weaker inductive grounds are not too lucky (or, relatedly, because they are safe). A case is presented that shows that this solution to the puzzle is actually not viable. It is argued that there is no obvious alternative solution in sight and that therefore the puzzle still awaits a classical invariantist solution. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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