Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions.
The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventi...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 27; no. 1/2; pp. 57 - 73 |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2008
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=33234721&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 33234721 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2008 vid: 27 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 33234721 10.1007/s11245-008-9028-1 ppf: 57 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 388KB tig: atl: Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions. aug: su: Convention (Philosophy) Modern philosophers Game theory Socialization Gilbert, Margaret Lewis, David Human behavior Evolution & philosophy sug: subj: Convention (Philosophy) Modern philosophers Game theory Socialization Gilbert, Margaret Lewis, David Human behavior Evolution & philosophy ab: The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game theory readily explains the origin of conventional behavior, but that is not Lewis’s project. Gilbert’s critique is generalized by reference to Bacharach’s (2006) work on team reasoning in games. The paper then argues that although Lewis’s account of the rationalization of conventions is shown by the reconstruction of Gilbert’s critique to be incomplete, Gilbert is wrong to conclude that classical (‘eductive’) game theory lacks the resources to explain conformity to conventions among people. A game-theoretic account of the dynamics of socialization, based on Ross’s (2005, 2006) idea of ‘game determination’, rationalizes choices of conventional strategies in overlapping generations contexts, provided agents are products of evolutionary selection and know that other players are also such products. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|