Metaphor, Modularity, and the Evolution of Conceptual Integration.
We integrate information from distinct domains, especially in metaphor. What sort of cognitive architecture underlies this kind of integration? Fodor (1983) argued that it involves nonmodular mechanisms. He also contended that the nonmodular mechanisms evolved from modular ones through a process of...
| Published in: | Metaphor & Symbol Vol. 15; no. 3; pp. 137 - 159 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
2000
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=3402885&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 3402885 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10926488 7MO jtl: Metaphor & Symbol issn: 10926488 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2000 vid: 15 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 3402885 10.1207/S15327868MS1503_2 ppf: 137 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 3402885 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 3402885 tig: atl: Metaphor, Modularity, and the Evolution of Conceptual Integration. aug: au: Chiappe, Dan L. affil: Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University su: Metaphor Integration (Theory of knowledge) Modularity (Psychology) sug: subj: Metaphor Integration (Theory of knowledge) Modularity (Psychology) ab: We integrate information from distinct domains, especially in metaphor. What sort of cognitive architecture underlies this kind of integration? Fodor (1983) argued that it involves nonmodular mechanisms. He also contended that the nonmodular mechanisms evolved from modular ones through a process of demodularization, a position elaborated by Mithen (1996). In this article, I defend Fodor and Mithen from criticisms offered by Sperber (1994). Sperber suggested that nonmodular mechanisms are unlikely to have evolved because an increasingly large database would incapacitate the cognitive system due to combinatorial explosion and the frame problem. Moreover, he argued that nonmodular mechanisms are not required to explain our ability to integrate information. I argue that proponents of demodularization can respond to Sperber's criticisms by assuming that either an expanding database co-evolved with increasingly sophisticated search mechanisms or the cognitive system evolved along connectionist lines. Moreover, I argue that Sperber's modular account of conceptual integration fails to satisfy the criteria for modularity-namely, information encapsulation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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