SUPERVALUATION FIXED-POINT LOGICS OF TRUTH.

Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question...

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Publicado en:Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 37; no. 5; pp. 407 - 441
Autores principales: Kremer, Philip, Urquhart, Alasdair
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Kremer, Philip
          Urquhart, Alasdair
        affil: Department of Philosophy , University of Toronto , 170 St. George St. Toronto Canada M5R 2M8
      su:
        Kremer, Michael
        Kripke, Saul A., 1940-2022
        Semantics
        Philosophy of language
        Truth
        Logic
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        subj:
          Kremer, Michael
          Kripke, Saul A., 1940-2022
          Semantics
          Philosophy of language
          Truth
          Logic
      keyword:
        fixed point logics
        languages
        truth
      ab: Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. We also consider variants, engendered by a stronger notion of ‘fixed point’, and by variant supervaluation schemes. A ‘logic’ is often thought of, not as a consequence relation, but as a set of sentences – the sentences true on each interpretation. We axiomatize the supervaluation fixed-point logics so conceived.
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