Reductive levels and multi-scale structure.

Abstract  I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feat...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 165; no. 1; pp. 53 - 76
Main Author: Patrick McGivern
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Nov2008
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Patrick McGivern
        affil: University of Alberta Department of Philosophy 4-115 Humanities Centre Edmonton AB Canada T6G 2E5
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        Attitude (Psychology)
        Psychology
        Expectation (Psychology)
        Paternalism
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          Attitude (Psychology)
          Psychology
          Expectation (Psychology)
          Paternalism
      ab: Abstract  I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.
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    language: English
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