Natural Selection as a Mechanism.
Skipper and Millstein (2005) argued that existing conceptions of mechanisms failed to "get at" natural selection but left open the possibility that a refined conception of mechanisms could resolve the problems that they identified. I respond to Skipper and Millstein, and argue that while many of the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 306 - 323 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=35388450&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 35388450 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2008 vid: 75 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 35388450 10.1086/593075 ppf: 306 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 214KB tig: atl: Natural Selection as a Mechanism. aug: au: Barros, D. Benjamin affil: Department of Philosophy, Skinner Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 su: Natural selection Mechanism (Philosophy) Probability theory Biological adaptation Logical prediction sug: subj: Natural selection Mechanism (Philosophy) Probability theory Biological adaptation Logical prediction ab: Skipper and Millstein (2005) argued that existing conceptions of mechanisms failed to "get at" natural selection but left open the possibility that a refined conception of mechanisms could resolve the problems that they identified. I respond to Skipper and Millstein, and argue that while many of their points have merit, their objections can be overcome and that natural selection can be characterized as a mechanism. Inmaking this argument, I discuss the role of regularity in mechanisms, and develop an account of stochastic (i.e., probabilistic) mechanisms. Explaining the phenomenon of adaptation through the mechanism of natural selection illustrates the power and flexibility of using mechanistic strategies to explain natural phenomena. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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