TIME TRAVEL WITHOUT CAUSAL LOOPS.

It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in th...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59; no. 234; pp. 54 - 68
Autor principal: Monton, Bradley
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2009
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Time travel
        Spacetime
        Causation (Philosophy)
        Causal models
        Metaphysics
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          Time travel
          Spacetime
          Causation (Philosophy)
          Causal models
          Metaphysics
      ab: It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing.
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