THE SECOND-ORDER PROPERTY VIEW OF EXISTENCE.

In this paper, I examine the current case against the second-order property view of existence through a discussion of Colin McGinn's up to date statement of this case. I conclude that the second-order property view of existence remains viable.

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 486 - 497
Main Author: KATZAV, JOEL
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2008
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: KATZAV, JOEL
        affil: Department of Philosophy University of Leeds
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        Newton-Raphson method
        McGinn, Colin, 1950-
        Reason
        Rhetoric
        Philosophy
        Feasibility studies
        Discussion
        Debate
        Ontological proof of God
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          Newton-Raphson method
          McGinn, Colin, 1950-
          Reason
          Rhetoric
          Philosophy
          Feasibility studies
          Discussion
          Debate
          Ontological proof of God
      ab: In this paper, I examine the current case against the second-order property view of existence through a discussion of Colin McGinn's up to date statement of this case. I conclude that the second-order property view of existence remains viable.
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