Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction.
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a conting...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 142; no. 2; pp. 221 - 247 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jan2009
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=35820292&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 35820292 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2009 vid: 142 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 35820292 10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y ppf: 221 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 307KB tig: atl: Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction. aug: au: Ichikawa, Jonathan Jarvis, Benjamin affil: Philosophy , Rutgers University , 26 Nichol Ave. New Brunswick 08901-2882 USA Philosophy , Brown University , 54 College St. Providence 02912 USA su: Williamson, Timothy, 1955- Thought experiments Counterfactuals (Logic) Intuition Belief & doubt sug: subj: Williamson, Timothy, 1955- Thought experiments Counterfactuals (Logic) Intuition Belief & doubt keyword: A priori knowledge Gettier cases Intuitions Philosophical methodology Timothy Williamson ab: What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson’s account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier intuition are necessarily true and knowable a priori. Our view, like Williamson’s, avoids naturalistic skepticism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2009. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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