Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism.
Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 87; no. 1; pp. 35 - 43 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2009
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=35923552&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 35923552 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2009 vid: 87 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 35923552 10.1080/00048400802215422 ppf: 35 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 213KB tig: atl: Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism. aug: au: Effingham, Nikk affil: University of Glasgow su: Object (Philosophy) Vagueness (Philosophy) Universalism (Theology) Comparison (Psychology) Philosophy Ambiguity sug: subj: Object (Philosophy) Vagueness (Philosophy) Universalism (Theology) Comparison (Psychology) Philosophy Ambiguity ab: Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider's argument (§V). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§VI). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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