Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice.
Epistemic trust is an unacknowledged feature of medical knowledge. Claims of medical knowledge made by physicians, patients, and others require epistemic trust. And yet, it would be foolish to define all epistemic trust as epistemically responsible. Accordingly, I use a routine example in medical pr...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Medicine & Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 4; pp. 302 - 321 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Aug2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=35939161&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 35939161 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03605310 MPS jtl: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy issn: 03605310 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2008 vid: 33 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 35939161 10.1093/jmp/jhn013 ppf: 302 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 108KB tig: atl: Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice. aug: au: SCHWAB, ABRAHAM P. affil: Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York, USA su: Trust Virtue epistemology Medical care Diagnosis Health sug: subj: Trust Virtue epistemology Medical care Diagnosis Health keyword: epistemic responsibility reliabilism trust ab: Epistemic trust is an unacknowledged feature of medical knowledge. Claims of medical knowledge made by physicians, patients, and others require epistemic trust. And yet, it would be foolish to define all epistemic trust as epistemically responsible. Accordingly, I use a routine example in medical practice (a diagnostic test) to illustrate how epistemically responsible trust in medicine is trust in epistemically responsible individuals. I go on to illustrate how certain areas of current medical practice of medicine fall short of adequately distinguishing reliable and unreliable processes because of a failure to systematically evaluate health outcomes. I conclude by articulating the devastating obstacles to the consilience assumption, which takes intellectual character (rather than reliable belief-forming processes) as the standard for epistemic responsibility. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.. item: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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