OF BLACK BOXES, INSTRUMENTS, AND EXPERTS: TESTING THE VALIDITY OF FORENSIC SCIENCE.
This paper argues that judges assessing the scientific validity and the legal admissibility of forensic science techniques ought to privilege testing over explanation. Their evaluation of reliability should be more concerned with whether the technique has been adequately validated by appropriate emp...
| Publicado en: | Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) Vol. 5; no. 3; pp. 343 - 359 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Edinburgh University Press
2008
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=36259917&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 36259917 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 17423600 UP0 jtl: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) issn: 17423600 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2008 vid: 5 iid: 3 pid: 2327 pub: Edinburgh University Press artinfo: ui: 36259917 10.3366/E1742360008000440 ppf: 343 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 122KB tig: atl: OF BLACK BOXES, INSTRUMENTS, AND EXPERTS: TESTING THE VALIDITY OF FORENSIC SCIENCE. aug: au: MNOOKIN, JENNIFER L. affil: Vice Dean for Faculty & Research and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law su: Forensic sciences Science Legal evidence Trial practice Judicial process sug: subj: Forensic sciences Science Legal evidence Trial practice Judicial process ab: This paper argues that judges assessing the scientific validity and the legal admissibility of forensic science techniques ought to privilege testing over explanation. Their evaluation of reliability should be more concerned with whether the technique has been adequately validated by appropriate empirical testing than with whether the expert can offer an adequate description of the methods she uses, or satisfactorily explain her methodology or the theory from which her claims derive. This paper explores these issues within two specific contexts: latent fingerprint examination and the use of breath tests for the detection of alcohol. Especially in the forensic science arena, I suggest courts have often been seduced by superficially plausible explanations and descriptions of a technique or method, and permitted these to serve as a substitute for empirical testing. Thinking through these two examples illustrates both why evaluating the extent of testing should be the most important method by which courts assess reliability, and why, when other forms of explanatory evidence are readily available, we may nonetheless elect to make use of them. This paper suggests that these descriptions and explanations may at times usefully supplement evidence of testing, but should not generally be substituted for it. Finally, this paper embraces a kind of evidentiary pragmatism, in which the quantum of evidence required to establish legal reliability is determined not in the abstract, but in relation to the evidence that is, or ought to be, available as a result of reasonable research and investigation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) is the property of Edinburgh University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) holder: Edinburgh University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|