Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation?

Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore c...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 143; no. 1; pp. 59 - 63
Autor principal: Giere, Ronald
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2009
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis USA
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        Computer simulation
        Simulation methods & models
        Theory of knowledge
        Experiments
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          Computer simulation
          Simulation methods & models
          Theory of knowledge
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        Epistemological warrant
        Experimentation
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      ab: Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a target system. The source of this payoff is the existence of a causal interaction with the target system. A computer experiment, which does not go beyond the simulation system itself, lacks any such interaction. So computer experiments cannot confer any additional confidence in the fit (or lack thereof) between the simulation model and the target system.
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