Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.
Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge i...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 38; no. 2; pp. 179 - 228 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=36925405&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 36925405 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2009 vid: 38 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 36925405 10.1007/s10992-008-9087-1 ppf: 179 ppct: 49 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 809KB tig: atl: Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. aug: au: Bonnay, Denis Égré, Paul affil: Département d’Etudes Cognitives, IHPST, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris France Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS/ENS/CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris France su: Epistemics Semantics (Philosophy) Introspection Bounded rationality Theory of self-knowledge sug: subj: Epistemics Semantics (Philosophy) Introspection Bounded rationality Theory of self-knowledge keyword: agueness Centered semantics Common knowledge Epistemic logic Inexact knowledge Kripke semantics Luminosity Margin for error Token semantics Vagueness ab: Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2009. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2009 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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