'Spontaneous' Interethnic Order: The Emergence of Collective, Path-Dependent Cooperation.
Uses a social game to show that the emergence of collective, nonlinear path dependence within and across ethnic groups whose members discount the future and face no punishment for interethnic noncooperation makes 'spontaneous' interethnic cooperation a long-run equilibrium. Model of spontaneous in...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 44; no. 4; pp. 563 - 590 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2000
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Uses a social game to show that the emergence of collective, nonlinear path dependence within and across ethnic groups whose members discount the future and face no punishment for interethnic noncooperation makes 'spontaneous' interethnic cooperation a long-run equilibrium. Model of spontaneous interethnic order; Policy implications. |
|---|